The Ohio Supreme Court recently limited the opportunity under Ohio’s workers’ compensation laws for the allowance of psychiatric conditions. Armstrong v. John R. Jurgensen Co. (June 14, 2013), 2011-Ohio-708. In order to recover for a psychiatric condition in Ohio, the Supreme Court held that there must be proof of a direct and proximate causal relationship between the physical injuries allowed in the claim and the mental condition at issue.
The Armstrong decision dealt with the diagnosis of post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD). The claimant was alleged to have PTSD as a result of his involvement in a motor vehicle accident. Mr. Armstrong was physically injured in the incident and, therefore, had a compensable claim under Ohio’s workers’ compensation system. It was undisputed that Mr. Armstrong was accurately diagnosed with PTSD.
A dispute, however, arose as to the actual cause of the PTSD. The employer’s psychiatric expert concluded that Mr. Armstrong’s PTSD was not the result of his physical injuries or the effects of those injuries but, instead, arose from the fact that he witnessed the severe injuries others suffered in the accident. It was the defense expert’s opinion that Mr. Armstrong would have developed PTSD even without his physical injuries. Even though the Plaintiff offered a contrary opinion from their psychiatric expert, in a trial to the bench, the trial judge rejected Mr. Armstrong’s arguments and, instead, relied upon the defense expert to deny recognition of the PTSD as a compensable psychiatric condition. Thereafter, Mr. Armstrong appealed this decision through the Court of Appeals and, again, to the Supreme Court for a final determination.
In adopting a very narrow interpretation of the injury statute, O.R.C. 4123.01(C)(1), as it relates to psychiatric conditions, the Supreme Court held that there must be evidence of a direct causal relationship between the claimant’s physical injuries and his alleged psychiatric conditions. It is not enough that they arose contemporaneously with, or were associated with conditions and circumstances that caused the physical injury. In rejecting the argument presented by Mr. Armstrong that the term “injury” embraces the entire episode or accident giving rise to the claimant’s physical injuries, the Court ruled that it is the result or harm that constitutes the injury received by the claimant and it is from that harm that the claimant’s psychiatric conditions must arise. Again, in this instance, there was medical evidence presented that Mr. Armstrong’s PTSD arose from the fact that he witnessed the accident and not from the effects of his own physical injuries.
As a result of this decision any claimant who seeks to add a psychiatric condition to his or her claim must provide competent medical testimony that establishes that the psychiatric condition arose from complications and/or symptoms of the actual physical injury suffered by the claimant. For instance, chronic pain and loss of mobility would be directly related to the physical injury and could be the basis for an allowable psychiatric condition. However, it may now be easier to defend against a request for an additional psychiatric condition if the claimant is alleging that the condition was caused by financial problems encountered by the claimant after their injury, or personal problems with a spouse, or even loss of a job. This provides another point of analysis for the defense in evaluating potential psychiatric conditions. There is certain to be additional litigation arising out of the Armstrong decision in its application to this complicated area of the workers’ compensation laws.