On March 25, 2015, the U.S. Supreme Court discussed whether, and in what circumstances, the Pregnancy Discrimination Act requires an employer that provides work accommodations to non-pregnant employees with work limitations to provide work accommodations to pregnant employees who are “similar in their ability or inability to work.” Young v. United Parcel Service, No. 12-1226.
The Plaintiff, Ms. Young, was a part-time driver for UPS. When she became pregnant, her doctor advised her that she should not lift more than 20 pounds. UPS told Ms. Young that she could not continue to work because drivers were required to be able to lift up to 70 pounds. Ms. Young sued UPS and UPS sought summary judgment. In response, Ms. Young argued that UPS had accommodated several other employees whose disabilities created work restrictions similar to hers. UPS argued that because Ms. Young did not fall within the on-the-job injury, ADA, or DOT categories, it had not discriminated against Ms. Young on the basis of her pregnancy, but instead had treated her just as it treated all other similar employees (those with off-the-job injuries or conditions). The District Court granted summary judgment, finding that those employees to which Ms. Young compared herself (those falling within the on-the-job, DOT, or ADA categories) were not “similarly situated.” The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the district court’s decision and Ms. Young filed a petition to the U.S. Supreme Court.
In its opinion, the U.S. Supreme Court noted that the Pregnancy Discrimination Act mandates that pregnant employees be treated “as other persons not so affected but similar in their ability or inability to work.” The Court found that a plaintiff can make out a prima facie case by showing that she belongs to the protected class, that she sought accommodation, and that the employer did accommodate others “similarly situated in their ability or inability to work.” Then the employer may justify its refusal to accommodate by demonstrating legitimate, non-discriminatory reasons. The burden then shifts back to the plaintiff to show pretext by showing sufficient evidence that the employer’s policies impose a significant burden on pregnant women and that the employer’s reasons are not strong enough to justify the burden. The Court then concluded that there was a genuine issue of fact as to whether UPS provided more favorable treatment to at least some employees whose situation cannot reasonably be distinguished from Ms. Young. The case has been remanded back to the Fourth Circuit. Three justices dissented.
Employers should keep in mind the U.S. Supreme Court’s interpretation of the Pregnancy Discrimination Act when they are presented by a request for accommodation by a pregnant employee. When this occurs, employers must consider what, if any, accommodations they have provided for all other employees, not just other pregnant employees or employees affected by off-the-job injuries and conditions.